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COMMENT
A

MISINTERPRETATION OF FACTS:

Wyman v. James

INTRODUCTION

N January of 1971, the United States Supreme Court handed
down Wyman v. James,' a now infamous decision. Quite simply, James held that a benficiary of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) may not refuse a home visit by a
caseworker without risking the termination of program benefits.
The decision has already been criticized in many journals
for its failure to follow precedent or to defend a welfare client's
constitutional right to privacy.2 In contrast to these articles,
this note attempts to prove the Court's decision erroneous by
illustrating the opinion's faulty analysis of the facts involved.
Regardless of the validity of the legal arguments, it is evident
from the opinion that the Court had little actual knowledge
of the caseworker-client relationship or the coercive nature of
the visit with which the case was concerned. In a complex
socio-legal problem such as this case presented, legal precedent
must be complemented with informed sociological opinion. Such
material will be the basis for this short note and will illustrate
that the Court's refusal to consider this information strongly
contributed to the faulty legal reasoning found in James.
THE MISINTERPRETATION

A.

The Holding

Justice Blackmun in writing for the Court held that: (1)
the visit requested was not properly a "search;" (2) that even
if it were, it was not unreasonable and therefore not violative
of the fourth amendment; (3) and that Mrs. James' loss was
due to a "choice .. .entirely hers, and nothing of constitutional
magnitude [was] involved."'
This opinion minimized the investigative aspects of the
visit and emphasized the government's contention that the pur-

l400 U.S. 309 (1971).
2 See generally Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents:
The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259 (1971); Note,
The Implications of Wyman v. James: The Burger Court, The Fourth
Amendment and the Privacy of the Home, 48 DENVER L.J. 87 (1971);
Note, Wyman v. James: Is a Man's Home Still His Castle?, 10 J. FAM. L.
460 (1971); Comment, Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment - New
York State Mandated Home Visit is Not an Unreasonable SearchPublic Assistance Recipients Must Submit-Wyman v. James, 35 ALBANY L. REV. 809 (1971); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 258 (1971).

3400 U.S. at 324.
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pose was primarily a beneficent one. The decision was predicated upon the premise that since there was no criminal
investigation or prosecution involved, there was no true search;
and, if the visit was not a "search," it was not an intrusion
coming within the prohibition of the fourth amendment. This
premise illustrates a misunderstanding of the subject before
the Court.
B. The Caseworker-Client Relationship
Justice Blackmun, in holding the home visit in question
not to be a search in the traditional criminal law context, noted
it is "not one by police or uniformed authority. '4 The primary
objective of the visit, according to the majority, is the welfare
of the child and the rehabilitation of the client. In other words,
"[t]he caseworker is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a
friend .. .in need."5
Justice Blackmun and his concurring Justices have glossed
'too glibly over the investigative aspects of the caseworkerrecipient relationship and have vastly overemphasized the beneficence and amicability of that same relationship. It is unfortunate that the Court's decision depends on conclusions
drawn as a result of this overemphasis, since careful research
would have revealed that the average caseworker-recipient
relationship is a far more adversary one than envisioned in
the opinion.
First, the welfare regulation upon which the rationale for
the visit was originally grounded places an apparently higher
priority on fraud control than on the extension of services
which Blackmun lauds.
[The visit is] for the purpose of determining if there are any
changes in her situation that might affect her eligibility to continue to receive Public Assistance, or that might affect the
amount of such assistance, and to see if there are any social
services which the Department of Social Services can provide

to the

family. 6

Even a casual reading of this statement leads to the conclusion that the drafters' concern for social services occupied a
lower rung on the legislative ladder than did the possibility
of paring the undeserving from the welfare rolls. This emphasis
reappears at the lower administrative levels, where many
caseworkers "enter the department as 'guardians of the public
purse.' They are adversaries of the people on relief"7 and are
4 Id. at 322.
5 Id. at 323.
6 Id. at 314.
7 E. MAY, THE

WASTED AMERICANS

106 (1964).
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more interested in keeping public expenditures to a minimum
than in achieving a maximization of benefits of their clients.
Combined with the adversary nature of the eligibility
determination visit is the basic feeling of distrust between the
worker and client which creates a competitive climate:
[A]gency personnel are sometimes inadequate because their commitment is to a narrow psychoanalytic framework, one that leads
them to condemn and censor the client for his presumed personal faults. The poor, Irving Kristol reminds us, are "entitled
to have every possible opportunity to move upward on our
socio-economic scale, if they wish to. But they are also entitled
not to be hectored, badgered, sermonized, psychoanalyzed, fingerprinted, Rorschached, and generally bossed around by a self8
appointed body of self-anointed redeemers .... ,

In fact, neither Mrs. James, nor the National Welfare Rights
Organization 9 placed much credence in the friendly intentions
of the welfare department in the instant case.
C.

Effectiveness of the Service Function

Even disregarding the adversary approach which many
caseworkers apparently bring to the job, it is hard to find much
of an effective rehabilitative or service function in the available statistics. This may be true because "caseworkers, whatever their theoretical framework, seldom have adequate time
and energy to spend with all their clients. A social worker in
New York state . . . must fill out 24 separate pieces of paper
before a client gets his first welfare check. . . . Little individual attention is possible; little real aid is given." 10 Furthermore, case loads are commonly well over practical limits,
the result being that "casework becomes a fiction and public
welfare becomes a function of the check-writing and adding
machine."11
An analysis of this failing relationship appeared in 1969
when the Institute for Research on Poverty released an exhaustive study on the extension of social services within the
public welfare scheme and the reaction of AFDC recipients to
those "services. '12 The study's results point strongly to the
conclusion that very little of a tangible and specific nature
is offered to the welfare client in general.
What emerges from the data is that, in the main, social service activity is little more than a relatively infrequent, pleasant
s Shostak, The Poverty of Welfare in America, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
POVERTY 97 (W. Gromberg & A. Shostak eds. 1965).
9 N.W.R.O. filed an amicus curiae brief on Mrs. James' behalf.
10 Shostak, supra note 8, at 97.
11 E. MAY, supra note 7, at 112.
12 Handler & Hollingsworth, The Administration of Social Services and
the Structure of Dependency: The Views of AFDC Recipients, 43 SOCIAL
SERv.

REV.

406 (1969).
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chat. It is somewhat supportive. It is rarely threatening but also
not too meaningful in the sense of either helping poor people get
things they need or of changing their lives, and it seems to bear
little resemblance to the legislative goals of the Social Security
Act amendments.13
Some critics, particularly the National Welfare Rights Organization, might quarrel with the conclusion that such activity
is "rarely threatening," but the other findings have been widely
supported. The joint study went on to recommend specifically,
among other things, that there be no caseworker visits in the
home, unless the client has requested the service.
Oddly enough, this view is evidently shared by many of
the caseworkers whose duty is to provide in-home service and
conduct eligibility checks. Shortly after the district court's
decision, and before the Supreme Court had heard arguments,
the Social Service Review commented in this regard:
In the James case one wonders what the experience of the
client had been during the two years which she received AFDC.
Obviously, she had not found the previous home visits of much
value, financially or otherwise. Certainly there was little feeling
of trust between client and agency. Under such circumstances
14
what could be achieved by another visit?
This view was supported in an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Mrs. James filed by the New York Social Service
Employees Union. Lack of training, lack of time, ineffectiveness of visits, and hostility which the visits created were all
cited by the Union to favor the proposition that the caseworker be spared such administrative responsibility. Let them
go to the homes where their aid was requested, and let investigative functions be carred out separately on the basis of
warrant and probable cause, not under the umbrella of service
extension. Service effectiveness would be enhanced from the
time gained thereby, and the chilling effect of such visits
would be avoided. The Court, in ignoring this plea, chose to
grant the Union's members even broader discretionary powers,
the exact opposite of what they requested.
It is clear that the jargon used by New York in pleading
its case, and by Justice Blackmun in finding for them, is designed to downplay the real purpose of the visit: to find welfare cheats. It is unfortunate again, that neither had looked
more closely into the effectiveness of such eligibility investigations. Most of the studies on the problem have indicated
that such efforts turn up only negligible amounts of fraud in
13 Id. at 413-14 (emphasis added).
14 Comment, Is the Home Visit Obsolete?, 43 SOCIAL SERV. REV. 463 (1969).
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relation to the total case load I5 and cost more than the amounts
trimmed by finding ineligible recipients. 1 Indeed, this was
a crucial point emphasized in the arguments:
The Social Service Employees Union, which represents the
caseworkers, told the Supreme Court in a friend-of-court brief
that home visits are ineffective to discover fraud, and the chil17
dren are usually at home and aren't even seen.

However, the Court again chose to overlook the facts.
In sum, the "welfare of the child" plus the assistance- and
rehabilitative functions which Justice Blackmun uses to rationalize entrance to the James home turn out to be paper justifications only. In point of fact, they serve more often than
not as a cloak for the real purpose of the visit: investigation.
That the investigation is not one by "uniformed authority"
affords the client little comfort. If, as Justice Blackmun says,
the fedral emphasis is upon "maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection,""' it is hard to imagine
how that sense of independence and pride is helped by
official intrusions into the home under the threat of benefit
termination. Rehabilitation implies, among other things, a sense
of dignity and pride in oneself -a
willingness to face the
world on its own terms. Even the mere acceptance of welfare
benefits is, to many individuals, a blow to this pride and selfrespect, an acknowledgement of defeat. In itself, "[w]elfare
assistance in its present form tends to encourage dependence,
withdrawal, diffused hostility, indifference, ennui."19 It concurrently supplies support only while undermining self-re20
liance.
D.

The Nature of In-Home Visits: Coercive v. Voluntary

The Court also held that, since the home visit is not a
criminal investigation, and no criminal penalty is the result
of refusal to allow the visit, the visitation "in itself is not
forced or compelled."' 21 Without that necessary force or compulsion, the Court felt that there was no sufficient official
intrusion upon the James family's privacy.
supra note 7, at 38-39.
Feb. 8, 1971, at 24-25.
17 N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1971, at 8E, col. 1.
18 400 U.S. at 319, Justice Blackmun quoting from 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
19 Miller, Some Thoughts on Reform, in BLUE-COLLAR WORLD 302 (W.
Gromberg & A. Shostak eds. 1964).
20 R. O'NEILL, THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCY: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WELFARE
STATE 292 (1970).
21 400 U.S. at 317.
15 E.

MAY,

16 NEWSWEEK,
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To say, as Justice Blackmun does, that the visit is not
forced or compelled is specious reasoning. Submission to coercion is not "consent" in either the legal or the lay sense of
the term. If forcing a dependent client to choose between assistance termination and opening the door is not coercion, it
is hard to imagine what might qualify. Justice Blackmun insists that the choice is entirely Mrs. James'. This ignores one
of the basic facts of welfare: most people are recipients not
22
by choice, but because of the lack of an alternative choice.
"For most such individuals, access to the benefit is as essential as the monthly paycheck of an employee in private industry. '23 The choice for Mrs. James is to feed and clothe her
children, or not to do so. Basic subsistence is hardly a mere
option.
On this point of freedom of choice, Robert O'Neill's study
on conditioned benefits in the welfare state concludes that the
general benefactor-recipient relationship can be considered voluntary only in the most technical sense; and that the unique
relationship between welfare client and caseworker in particular is by nature subtly coercive. 24 Justice Blackmun and
the majority, however, in recognizing no coercion, found no
deprivation of a magnitude sufficient to warrant protection under the Constitution. Actually, the crucial importance of welfare
payments to the recipients "would seem . . . to point to the
conclusion that welfare is entitled to special protection under
the equal protection clause.' 25 Unfortunately, however,
[W]hile many such benefits are as substantial and important in
the life of the beneficiary as, for example, freedom from crimi-

nal conviction, they are granted or withheld on conditions and
through procedures 20that offer far less protection for individual
rights and liberties.
Despite the pains to which Justice Blackmun goes to distinguish the visitation in James from those considered by the
Court in prior cases, the facts simply do not lend themselves
to his conclusions. His interpretation of the background and
actions in the instant case is sound only if one accepts some
initially faulty presumptions about caseworker-recipient relationships, the effectiveness of the service function, and the
voluntary nature of welfare benefit receipt. Having shown
22 COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVING THE PUBLIC WEL23
24
25

26

FARE SYSTEM 31 (1970).
Pemberton, Book Review, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1961 (1971).
R. O'NEILL, supra note 20, at 276.
The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REV. 32, 68 (1970).

Pemberton, supra note 23, at 1961.

1972

COMMENT

those assumptions to be based on less than solid evidence, we
have shown part of the fault with the decision as a whole.
CONCLUSION
One must conclude that Justice Blackmun has not adequately done his research in James, at least at the factual
level. Since service functions on the part of welfare departments are clearly ineffective, there is no rational point in
intruding on an individual's privacy to enforce them. In the
case at bar, as in so many thousands of everyday similar situations, an appointment outside the home would do far more
to preserve the dignity and pride necessary for eventual selfsupport without sacrificing any of the benefits which the present
system realistically accomplishes.
Recent surveys indicate a general resentment among welfare recipients towards both the system and those who administer it. 27 If the welfare system itself gives rise to such selfdefeating effects, how much will the type of administrative
behavior countenanced in James aggravate the problem? In
Brinegar v. United States,28 Justice Jackson eloquently stated:
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing
a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting
terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of
the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every
arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt
and worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear
where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour
29
to unheralded search and seizure by the police.

Although Jackson's dissent was directed to warrantless searches
by uniformed officers, his observance of the psychological effects on the human spirit is equally applicable to cases such
as James.
There will undoubtedly be mixed reactions from the membership of the welfare community itself to this opinion. The
impact of the decision on the individual recipient must clearly
be negative in terms of self-image, pride, and self-reliance. As
several attorneys were quick to note, the decision has unmistakably relegated public welfare recipients to the status of
"second-class citizens." In so doing, it reinforces the self-defeating aspects of welfare noted earlier and contributes to the
cyclical aspects of dependency which have created second and
27 R. O'NEILL, supra note 20, at 253.
338 U.S. 160 (1949).
29 Id. at 180 (dissenting opinion)
28

(emphasis added).
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third generations of public aid dependents. Thus, while the
Court purports to be looking out for the interests of the public
in the distribution of its largesse, the ultimate effect is to
ensure that those expenditures are largely wasted.
Finally, the greatest damage may well have been to the
keepers of the system. Worker morale has long been a problem
in the field of public welfare.30 High caseloads and mountains
of paper work which combine to abort the effective service
function have done nothing to attract qualified persons to the
social services: "It is still unusual for a social worker employed
in a direct service position in either private or public welfare
to have had graduate education in social work, but it is more
'3 1
unusual in the public assistance field than anywhere else."
Indeed, it has had the opposite effect:
In 1968, more than 110,000 persons were employed in the
nation's public welfare programs; a little over 80,000 of these
worked in the federally-aided programs. The annual turnover
averaged close to 30 per cent; some states had as high as 40 per
cent, while one or two went as high as 60 per cent. Less than
2,000 of the 110,000 had a degree in social work or the equivalent. This professional group had a job turnover in excess of 20
32
per cent a year.
3
Turnover rates have subsequently climbed even higher.
One of the causes has been the nature of the investigative
procedures for recipient qualification, which are "repressive
and demeaning to the recipients of welfare, as well as being
one of the chief sources of the very widespread inefficiency and
waste of manpower that afflicts the entire system. ' '34 Frustration at that inefficiency was one of the motives which impelled the social worker's union in New York to file its brief
on behalf of Mrs. James. If, as we noted earlier, the states
are increasingly resorting again to investigations and spotchecks to pare the burgeoning rolls, this caseworker frustration
must similarly increase. The result must be an even higher
exodus of the dedicated to occupations where they can exercise
their training instead of playing at form-filling and police work.
The Court's failure to restrict the permissible types of administrative behavior may thus indirectly be a blow at those whose
responsibility it is to see that the system functions.
Gregory F. Long

3o E. MAY, supra note 7, at 118.
31

G.

STEINER,

SOCIAL INSECURITY:

33 NEWSWEEK,

supra note 22, at 51.
Feb. 8, 1971, at 26.

34 COMMITTEE,

supra note 22, at 11.

32 COMMITTEE,

THE

POLITICS OF

WELFARE

183 (1966).

